The Causal Exclusion Argument and its Critique in Debates on Reductionism: The Case of One Specific Clash

by Oleksandr Holubenko^1
1 V.N. Karazin Kharkiv National University (Kharkiv, Ukraine)
DOI: https://doi.org/10.29202/phil-cosm/32/10
Received: 15 November 2023 / Accepted: 18 December 2023 / Published: 5 February 2024

One of the modern forms of philosophical discussion about the essence of mentality is the dispute between (“classical”) physicalists (who take a reductionist position) and the so-called non-reductive materialists. Non-reductive materialists are property dualists who claim supervenient relations between physical and mental properties. Such a non-reductive scheme claims that mental properties occupy a specific ontological level and, as a result, have their own causal power. Perhaps the most effective physicalist counterargument against such a position is the Causal Exclusion Argument, which makes explicit several logical contradictions inherent in non-reductive materialism. One of the most famous physicalists who contributed to the formulation of this argument was Jaegwon Kim. Considering the logical aspects of the philosophical dispute between reductionists and non-reductive materialists is very important because the resolution of this issue has direct consequences for the construction of new anthropological theories and cosmological models. In particular, clarifying the nature of the phenomenon of emergence and determining the limits of reduction can either inspire a certain “descriptive relativism” in scientific theories or encourage the continuation of the search for the “fundamental” level of physical reality (to which any anthropological theory can ultimately be reduced). In this article, I analyze the most significant objections put forward by Ned Block, a wellknown apologist for non-reductive materialism, to the Causal Exclusion Argument. In conclusion, I argue that none of Block’s counterarguments can resolve the logical contradictions stressed by Kim.

Keywords: physicalism, reductionism, non-reductive materialism, causal closure, emergence, anthropology, cosmological models

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Holubenko, Oleksandr (2024) The Causal Exclusion Argument and its Critique in Debates on Reductionism: The Case of One Specific Clash. Philosophy and Cosmology, Volume 32, 127-140. https://doi.org/10.29202/phil-cosm/32/10